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Wagering contingent on a previous decision, or post-decision wagering, has recently been
proposed to measure conscious awareness. Whilst intuitively appealing, it remains unclear
whether economic context interacts with subjective conﬁdence and how such interactions
might impact on the measurement of awareness. Here we propose a signal detection model
which predicts that advantageous wagers placed on the identity of preceding stimuli are
affected by loss aversion, despite stimulus visibility remaining constant. This pattern of
predicted results was evident in a psychophysical task where we independently manipu-
lated perceptual and economic factors. Changes in wagering behaviour induced by changes
in wager size were largely driven by changes in criterion, consistent with the model. How-
ever, for near-threshold stimuli, a reduction in wagering efﬁciency was also evident, con-
sistent with an apparent but potentially illusory decrease in awareness of the stimulus.
These ﬁndings challenge an assertion that post-decision wagering provides a direct index
of subjective awareness.
 2009 Elsevier Inc. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
Knowledge of one’s own uncertainty regarding an outcome plays a key role in determining decision strategy (Foote &
Crystal, 2007; Hampton, 2001; Kepecs, Uchida, Zariwala, & Mainen, 2008; Kiani & Shadlen, 2009; Smith, Shields, & Wash-
burn, 2003), and may even be a central property of awareness (Cleeremans, Timmermans, & Pasquali, 2007; Dienes,
2008; Rosenthal, 2000, 2002). For example, knowing in advance that you are unlikely to pass a test makes you reluctant
to take the test in the ﬁrst place (Higham, 2007; Higham & Gerrard, 2005; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; Metcalfe & Finn,
2008), and may reﬂect awareness of your own (low) ability.
Such insights motivated the use of wagering contingent on decision performance (post-decision wagering) as a direct and
intuitive measure of conscious awareness (Koch & Preuschoff, 2007; Persaud & McLeod, 2008; Persaud, McLeod, & Cowey,
2007). In its simplest form, a participant is required to detect whether an arbitrary stimulus is present or not and then, in
a second stage, gamble on whether his/her response was correct or not. Advantageous wagers are made when participants
accurately assess the level of sensory evidence on each trial, linking objective performance to the subjectivity of stimulus
information (Persaud et al., 2007). Furthermore, using wagers to measure awareness can potentially overcome problems
of interpretation associated with a lack of control over subjective reports (Eriksen, 1960) and the motivation of a subject
(cf. Visser & Merikle, 1999). However, the interpretation of post-decision wagering data is potentially confounded by com-
plex factors affecting how gains and losses affect performance (Clifford, Arabzadeh, & Harris, 2008; Dienes & Seth, 2009;
Schurger & Sher, 2008), and a full behavioural analysis of advantages, and disadvantages, in deﬁning consciousness based
on these economic terms is lacking.Fleming).
BY license.
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(SDT). In the ﬁrst instance, it is assumed that objective features of the stimulus lead to a perceptual effect, modelled as a
univariate random variable X (Fig. 1a), which we label ‘‘sensory evidence”. Discrimination errors at this stage are inevitable
if the difference in sensory evidence between signal and noise (or other arbitrary category discriminations) is weak, leading
to overlapping probability distributions (Fig. 1a). It is thus assumed that participants make a decision by splicing up an evi-
dence axis into two halves using a decision criterion (Green & Swets, 1966). In a post-decision wagering experiment, the par-
ticipant is now required to make a high or low wager on whether they were correct. This requires knowledge both of how
likely it was that the ﬁrst decision was correct, and their expected return from the wager (Clifford et al., 2008). The former
can be recovered from the sensory evidence on a given trial (Galvin, Podd, Drga, & Whitmore, 2003). The latter, however, is
psychologically more complex given evidence that people are loss averse (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman,
1991), manifesting in a propensity to weight losses greater than gains when making value-based decisions. Loss aversion has
been suggested to impact on post-decision wagering performance by modulating a link between the assessment of sensory
evidence and overt conﬁdence (Schurger & Sher, 2008).
To quantify how wagering on sensory evidence is inﬂuenced by economic factors, we ﬁrst developed a simple computa-
tional model of post-decision wagering behaviour, building on previous work by Galvin and colleagues (Galvin et al., 2003),
but now extending this framework to encompass loss aversion. Using this model, we derive precise predictions about how
sensory evidence translates into advantageous wagering responses. The accuracy of metacognitive assessments can be intu-
ited as how transparent the initial decision process is to a putative ‘‘higher” level assessment. For example, if there is ambi-
guity in the decision process then the categorisation of one’s own performance as being correct, or incorrect, will be subject
to error. This intuition can be captured within the logic of signal detection theory (SDT), which assesses how faithfully an
organism separates signal from noise (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). In standard applications of
SDT (Type I), detection performance is assessed by a comparison of the proportion of ‘‘hits” and ‘‘false alarms” in a stimulus
detection task. By applying the logic of SDT to post-decision wagering, we categorise a ‘‘hit” as a high wager after a correct
decision and a ‘‘false alarm” as a high wager after an incorrect decision (see Table 1). This type of analysis is known as Type II
SDT (Clarke, Birdsall, & Tanner, 1959; Clifford et al., 2008; Galvin et al., 2003; Kunimoto, Miller, & Pashler, 2001; Macmillan &ba
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Fig. 1. Computational model of post-decision wagering performance. (a) Theoretical distributions over a random variable X (corresponding to an arbitrary
stimulus axis) for signal (S, solid line) and noise (N, broken line). (b) Probability distributions over different values of X for the probability of making a
correct (solid line) and incorrect (broken line) categorisation. Shaded areas represent the integrals speciﬁed in Eqs. (9) (Hw, grey) and (10) (FAw, black). (c)
Schematic of the loss-averse utility function used in the model.
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performance by applying an ideal observer framework, enabling us to explore the relationship between post-decision wager-
ing and changes in sensory evidence. Our speciﬁc prediction here was that post-decision wagering would be inﬂuenced by
loss aversion, decoupling a link between perception and conﬁdent responding. To test our model, we examine data from a
psychophysical experiment in which subjects made a high or low wager following a simple sensory judgement.
2. Methods
2.1. Signal detection model
In signal detection theory (SDT), a Type I decision is based upon overlapping Gaussian probability distributions over a
random variable X, conditional on the events signal (S) and noise (N) (Fig. 1a). Assuming an unbiased response criterion,
c, for the Type I detection decision (Galvin et al., 2003), we can specify the distribution over X for the probability of the Type
I response being correct or incorrect:Table 1
Categor
Type
Corr
Incof ðxjCÞ ¼
f ðxjNÞ
pðCÞ ; x 6 c
f ðxjSÞ
pðCÞ ; x > c
8<
: ð1Þ
f ðxjIÞ ¼
f ðxjSÞ
pðIÞ ; x 6 c
f ðxjNÞ
pðIÞ ; x > c
8<
: ð2Þwhere p(C) and p(I) are the average probabilities of making a correct or incorrect response on any given trial (Macmillan &
Creelman, 2005). Full derivations of Eqs. (1) and (2) can be found in (Galvin et al., 2003); the (constant) prior terms from their
more general analysis are omitted here for clarity. The distributions speciﬁed by (1) and (2) are plotted graphically in Fig. 1b.
It is important to note that these Type II distributions are conditional transformations based on whether the ﬁrst decision
was correct or not. That is, the shape of the f(x|C) curve follows the signal distribution when x > c (a Type I hit) and the noise
distribution when x < c (a Type I correct rejection). Similarly, the shape of the f(x|I) curve follows shape of the noise distri-
bution when x > c (a Type I false alarm) and the signal distribution when x < c (a Type I miss). The heights of both f(x|C) and
f(x|I) are then scaled so that they sum to one.
A correct Type II response is more likely towards the left or right-hand extremes of X in Fig. 1b (high signal or high noise
trials), whereas incorrect responses predominate where there is maximal overlap between signal and noise. The inherent
assumption here is that the uncertainty associated with being sure of seeing something is the same as the uncertainty asso-
ciated with being sure of not seeing something (the Type II distributions are symmetric around X = 0), an assumption we
return to under Sections 3 and 4.
The log-likelihood of being correct on any given trial (likelihood ratio; LR) is the log of the ratio of (1) and (2):LR ¼ log f ðxjCÞ
f ðxjIÞ
 
ð3ÞWe assume that high wagers are made when the log-likelihood of being correct on the Type I task reaches a given crite-
rion, bw. As the likelihood ratio is symmetric around c, there are thus two values of x for each bw, one for when x 6 c and one
for when x > c. This corresponds to being sure that a signal was or was not present and wagering high.
In standard applications of SDT, the optimal placement of the log-likelihood ratio criterion can be calculated based on the
relative utility of making a hit (H), miss (M), correct rejection (CR) or false alarm (FA) (assuming equal priors), as follows
(Macmillan & Creelman, 2005):b ¼ log RðCRÞ  RðFAÞ
RðHÞ  RðMÞ
 
ð4ÞIn Type I SDT, it is likely that the ‘‘reward” (R) for a false alarm or miss will be negative. Imagine taking part in a psycho-
physical task where the penalty was £1 for a false alarm and 1p for a miss, with 10p earned for correct responses. The opti-
mal value of b would then be (0.1  (1))/(0.1  (0.01)) = 10: the odds favouring stimulus B should be 10:1 or better in
order to risk a ‘‘B” response (that associated with the false alarm penalty). In our Type II analysis, we similarly assume thatisation of subjects’ wagering responses for a Type II signal detection analysis.
I decision High wager Low wager
ect Hit Miss
rrect False alarm Correct rejection
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mapped onto the four SDT categories of Eq. (4) using Table 1. This ratio is then adjusted by the prior probability of the trial
being correct or incorrect (P(C) and P(I)):Fig. 2.
wager o
aroundbw ¼ log
CL  CH
RH  RL :
PðIÞ
PðCÞ
 
ð5ÞIn contrast to Eq. (4) for Type I SDT, in Eq. (5) both hits and misses are associated with positive outcomes (trials are
labelled ‘‘misses” when the Type I response was correct but only the low wager was used, leading to a lower reward than
could have been obtained, but still a reward; cf. Kunimoto et al., 2001). Thus, the terms in the denominator of Eq. (5) are
the positive utilities of each wager (R), whereas the outcomes in the numerator are associated with the negative costs of
losing each wager (C) following incorrect responses.
Crucially, we incorporate asymmetric utility curves when calculating the values of R and C, as proposed within Prospect
Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). A schematic of such a curve is shown in Fig. 1c. Risk aversion for mixed (gain or loss)
gambles is explained through loss aversion, such that given the same absolute value losses carry a greater impact than gains
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). This nonlinear relationship between gain (R) and loss (C) leads to a value of bw that is depen-
dent on the size of the high wager, assuming the low wager remains ﬁxed for simplicity.
The positive and negative utility of each wager is speciﬁed as follows:R ¼ Vr ; V > 0 ð6Þ
C ¼ sðVÞt ; V < 0 ð7Þwhere V is the objective value of the wager, r and t are power functions for the gain and loss domain respectively, and s is the
loss aversion index. We restricted r and t such that 0 < r < t < 1, resulting in utility being concave for gains, convex for losses
and more linear in losses than in gains (Fennema & Van Assen, 1999; Kobberling & Wakker, 2005). We deﬁne c ±m (as the
likelihood ratio is symmetric about c) as values of x such that:log
f ðxjCÞ
f ðxjIÞ
 
¼ bw ð8ÞUsing the signal detection categories of Table 1, we then compute theoretical hit and false alarm rates for a range of values
of m by integrating over the Type II probability distributions speciﬁed in (1), (2) and Fig. 1b:Hw ¼
Z cm
1
f ðxjCÞdxþ
Z 1
cþm
f ðxjCÞdx ð9Þ
FAw ¼
Z cm
1
f ðxjIÞdxþ
Z 1
cþm
f ðxjIÞdx ð10Þ2.2. Psychophysics
Thirteen participants (3 male, 10 female, mean age 27 ± 8.6 years) performed a lexical decision task spread over two ses-
sions on consecutive days, each contributing 1440 trials to the analysis. The task was to decide whether a heavily masked
stimulus was a word or a non-word, and then to gamble either ‘‘high” or ‘‘low” depending on the correctness of their initial
judgement (Fig. 2). One-hundred and seventy-two four-letter words were taken from the MRC Psycholinguistic Database
(Wilson, 1988), and matched for familiarity and written frequency of occurrence. A related set of pronounceable non-wordsPsychophysical task design. Participants were required to detect whether a masked stimulus was a word or a non-word, and then place a high or low
n whether their initial response was correct or not. To increase stimulus uncertainty, the target and mask could appear at any one of four locations
a central ﬁxation cross (not shown).
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surrounding a central ﬁxation point. Threshold detection performance (79%) was assessed for each individual using a stair-
case procedure (Levitt, 1971); on each trial stimulus duration was 100%, 80% or 50% of this threshold. The low wager re-
mained constant across blocks at 50p; the value of the high wager varied across blocks (£1, £2, £5 or £10). Responses
were made using the left-hand (‘‘z” or ‘‘x” keys) to indicate the word/non-word, and the right-hand (‘‘up” or ‘‘down” arrow
keys) to indicate a high or low gamble.
Stimulus duration was randomised within blocks, giving a 3  4 factorial design crossing high wager size (£1, £2, £5 or
£10) with stimulus visibility (100%, 80% or 50% of threshold duration). This design allowed us to recover an estimate of
advantageous wagering (proportion of high wagers following correct responses; ‘‘hits” in Table 1) for each cell in our design.
Participants were informed that the wager they were making was a true mixed gamble: they would win the money they
wagered if their initial word/non-word decision was correct, and would have this amount deducted from their running total
if they were incorrect. They were also informed that only one trial from each block was to be evaluated at random, allowing
us to use relatively larger amounts of money while still encouraging participants to treat each trial as a meaningful gamble.
2.3. Analysis
To quantify a match between the psychophysical data and the model, we computed the likelihood of each subject’s
wagers under the model (from the integrals in Eqs. (9) and (10)), optimised over free parameters of the utility function.
We compared two parameterisations of the utility function: one with, and one without, a loss aversion constant (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1991). We took the parameters r, t and s to be free in Model 1 (loss averse + power), and r and t to be free
in Model 2 (power). The testable model space was constrained by requiring the loss and gain domains of the utility function
to be asymmetric, as symmetric functions do not predict any effect of wager size on the Type II response criterion (see Sup-
plementary Material for a more detailed discussion of empirical forms of the utility curve).
Type I sensitivity was set for each level of stimulus visibility using empirically estimated d0 values from each subject. For
each model, we ﬁt the free parameters to each participant’s choice data by maximising the likelihood of the observed
choices, using a nonlinear optimisation algorithm (fminsearch in the Matlab Optimisation toolbox). We report negative
log-likelihoods (smaller values indicate better ﬁt), penalised for model complexity using the Bayesian information criterion
(BIC) (Schwarz, 1978). To compare models at the group level we summed each subject’s BIC, resulting in a log group Bayes
factor (Stephan, Weiskopf, Drysdale, Robinson, & Friston, 2007).
For signal detection analysis, Type I ‘‘word” responses were classiﬁed as hits or false alarms; ‘‘non-word” responses were
classiﬁed as correct rejections or misses. For both the model and the data we computed Type II hit and false alarm rates using
the classiﬁcation scheme of Table 1. To allow comparison with previous datasets employing post-decision wagering (Persaud
& McLeod, 2008; Persaud et al., 2007), advantageous wagers were deﬁned as Type II hit rates (proportion of high gambles
made after correct decisions). A repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to analyse these proportions, fol-
lowing an arcsine transformation of the data to correct for heterogeneity of variance. In addition Type I SDT measures of the
initial perceptual discrimination (d0 and c) and Type II sensitivity (d0w) and criterion (cw) for the wagering response were cal-
culated as follows (where z is the inverse of the cumulative normal distribution function):d0 ¼ zðHÞ  zðFÞ ð11Þ
d0w ¼ zðHwÞ  zðFwÞ ð12Þ
c ¼ 0:5 zðHÞ þ zðFÞ½  ð13Þ
cw ¼ 0:5 zðHwÞ þ zðFwÞ½  ð14Þ0.5 was added to all cells in calculation of both Type I and Type II SDT measures to avoid extreme proportions of H or F (Hau-
tus, 1995). SDT measures calculated for each wager and sensitivity condition were analysed using repeated-measures
ANOVAs.3. Results
3.1. Model comparison
As an initial examination of the validity of our model, we computed estimates of advantageous wagering (the proportion
of high wagers following correct responses) from both the model output and psychophysical data (Fig. 3a and b). Perceptual
sensitivity levels in the model were set to match mean d0 values across subjects in the psychophysical experiment. It is clear
that advantageous wagering is predicted not only to increase as a function of perceptual sensitivity, but also to decrease as a
function of wager size. The latter decrease is a direct consequence of the loss-averse utility function implemented in the
model.
We next tested the model predictions against psychophysical data. Advantageous wagering decreased with both decreas-
ing stimulus visibility (effect of visibility; F(2,24) = 99.87, p < .0001) and with increasing wager size (effect of wager;
F(3,36) = 10.71, p < .0001; Fig. 3b), closely matching the predictions of the model (Fig. 3a). Even when the stimulus was most
Fig. 3. Comparison of computational model with psychophysical data. (a) Predicted proportions of advantageous wagers (proportion of high wagers
following correct initial responses) derived from the computational model illustrated in Fig. 1, plotted as a function of stimulus visibility (low, medium and
high) and high wager size. Stimulus visibility in the model was set to be equal to the empirically derived mean d0 values from the psychophysical task. (b)
Mean (±SEM) observed proportions of advantageous wagers from 13 subjects in the word/non-word detection task. (c) Negative log-likelihoods of the
model ﬁts to the psychophysical data summed over subjects, penalised for model complexity using Bayesian information criterion (BIC). More negative
values indicate a better ﬁt, with a difference of three indicating strong evidence for one model compared to the other (Penny, Stephan, Mechelli, & Friston,
2004). It can be seen that despite the penalty for an extra parameter, the model with the loss aversion constant s provides a better ﬁt to the data. (d) Utility
function created by averaging the best-ﬁt parameters from the power + loss averse model over subjects.
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between £1 and £10 wagers; t(12) = 3.90, p = .002). Indeed, for the range of stimulus durations we tested here, the effect
of wager size did not interact with stimulus visibility (F(6,72) < 1, p > .5).
In assessing the match between the psychophysical results and the model, we compared two parameterisations of the
utility function: one with a loss aversion constant (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991) and one without. The model with the loss
aversion constant was strongly preferred, despite the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) measure including a penalty
for additional complexity (Fig. 3c; BIC difference of 73.2, corresponding to an e73.2 difference in Bayes factor). This suggests
the transformation of perceptual sensitivity into conﬁdent wagering was indeed signiﬁcantly affected by the loss aversion
parameter of the model. The average utility function adopted by participants is shown in Fig. 3d. Across subjects, the loss
aversion parameter s ranged from 1.94 to 4.53, with a mean of 2.74 ± 0.92. Such a parameter range is comparable with pre-
vious ﬁndings in the literature (Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991).
3.2. Type I signal detection analysis
As expected, longer stimulus durations were associated with higher Type I d0 (F(2,24) = 123.47, p < .0001). Importantly,
however, Type I perceptual sensitivity remained constant across changes in wager size (interaction of wager size and
visibility: F(6,72) = 1.07, p > .3; Fig. 4a). As outlined in Section 2, an explicit assumption of our model is that Type I response
criteria are unbiased. To evaluate this assumption we calculated Type I criterion for the word/non-word discrimination as a
function of both stimulus visibility and wager size (Fig. 4b). A consistent bias towards responding ‘‘word” for the higher
visibility trials was observed, leading to a signiﬁcant effect of visibility on response criterion (F(2,24) = 23.48, p < .0001). How-
ever, as for d0, this bias was expressed consistently across changes in wager size (no interaction with wager size; F(6,72) = 1.31,
p > .2), suggesting that these criterion shifts are not sufﬁcient to explain biases in post-decision wagering induced by loss
aversion.
Fig. 4. Word/non-word task performance. Subjects’ performance (d0) (a) and criterion (b) in the Type I detection task as a function of both visibility and
wager size. Error bars reﬂect standard errors of the mean.
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The results described under Model Comparison above show that a typical post-decision wagering measure – Type II hit
rate – is subject to a bias that can be explained by loss aversion, despite the underlying Type I sensitivity to the stimulus
remaining constant. However, participants’ wagering efﬁciency (ability to discriminate between correct and incorrect trials)
might still be independent of their overall propensity to wager high (Higham, 2007; Kunimoto et al., 2001; but see Evans &
Azzopardi, 2007). In other words, despite using the £10 wager less than the £1 wager for a given level of sensitivity (Fig. 3b),
does this usage still discriminate well between correct and incorrect decisions?
To answer this question we computed Type II measures of wagering efﬁciency, d0w, and wagering criterion, cw (see Sec-
tion 2) from both model and psychophysics data, as a function of stimulus visibility and wager size (Fig. 5a and b). The model
predicts that wager size should primarily affect cw (due to loss aversion), without affecting d
0
w, which is a function of Type I d
0
(Fig. 5a; left-hand panel). The data indeed showed a strong main effect of wager size on cw (F(2,24) = 45.87, p < .0001), which
did not interact with stimulus visibility (F(6,72) = 0.56, p > .7), in agreement with the model (right-hand panel of Fig. 5b). The
model also predicts a main effect of stimulus visibility on cw, in that wagering is generally more conservative when the task is
more difﬁcult (Fig. 5a, right-hand panel), an effect borne out in the data (F(3,36) = 8.93, p < .005).
The match between the model and the data on d0w was less consistent. As predicted, we found a main effect of stimulus
visibility (F(2,24) = 7.78, p < .005; Fig. 5a), which did not show any signiﬁcant interactions with wager size (F(6,72) = 1.78,
p > .1). However, for the lowest visibility, we noted a downward trend in d0w as wager size increased, reﬂected in a linear
effect of wager size that interacted with visibility level (F(1,12) = 8.66, p = .012). Indeed, when comparing participants’ sensi-
tivity to their own correctness in low-visibility judgements for £1 and £10 wager blocks, d0w dropped by almost half (from
0.91 to 0.50). To ensure that these effects were not stimulus-speciﬁc (cf. Higham, Perfect, & Bruno, 2009; Experiment 3),
we reanalysed the low-visibility condition as a function of whether the stimulus was a word or non-word (Fig. 6). A main
effect of wager size on d0w was conﬁrmed (F(3,36) = 3.95, p = .016) which did not interact with stimulus type (F(3,36) < 1). A main
effect of stimulus type was also found (F(1,12) = 34.4, p < .001), replicating Higham et al.’s (2009) ﬁndings that monitoring is
worse for distractors (non-words in our task) than targets (words). Overall, our results show that the size of the wager largely
affects the criterion for using the high-wager response, but for near-threshold stimuli, also affects metacognitive
performance.
3.4. Test of model assumptions
An inherent assumption of our model is that the wagering criterion (m in Fig. 1b) is symmetric about c. In other words, it
is assumed that the same degree of loss aversion leads to similar wagering behaviour following reports of both signal and
noise trials. It is possible that these criteria (c +m and c m) are independently speciﬁed; for example, it may be easier
to be sure of seeing something than to be sure of not seeing something. To examine such effects, we split d0w and cw by
whether the ﬁrst response had been ‘‘word” or ‘‘non-word” (equivalent to calculating separate hit and false alarm rates
for the left- and right-hand sides of the distributions in Fig. 1b). These were entered into a 2 (Type I response)  3 (visibil-
ity)  4 (wager size) ANOVA. A robust main effect of Type I response on Cw was found (F(1,12) = 37.3, p < .0001), which was
driven by a more conservative criterion for wagering following non-word (mean cw = 0.60) compared to word responses
(mean cw = 0.16). Importantly, however, this dependence of cw on the initial decision was highly consistent across both
wager size (interaction with wager size; F(2,24) < 1, p > .9) and changes in stimulus visibility (F(3,36) < 1, p > .6), indicative of
a stable baseline shift that does not affect the experimental manipulations of interest. In addition, we conﬁrmed that the
effects of wager size on d0w and cw (reported in Section 3.3) were not qualiﬁed by interactions with stimulus or Type I
response (word/non-word; all F < 1).
Fig. 5. Type II signal detection analysis of wagering responses. (a) Predictions from the model output for the pattern of signal detection parameters (d0w , left-
hand panel; cw, right-hand panel) calculated using Table 1. Wagering efﬁciency (d
0
w) is expected to change as a function of Type I d
0 , but only slightly as a
function of wager size; the wagering criterion (cw) is expected to be affected by both wager size and Type I d0 . (b) Type II signal detection parameters from
the post-decision wagering task as a function of stimulus visibility and wager size. Error bars reﬂect standard errors of the mean.
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Fig. 6. Type II sensitivity (d0w) for near-threshold stimuli as a function of wager size and stimulus type (word/non-word). A signiﬁcant effect of wager size on
d0w was found that did not interact with stimulus type. Monitoring of performance following responses to words (targets) was increased compared to
monitoring of responses to non-words (distractors). Error bars reﬂect standard errors of the mean.
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rely on the assumption of equal variance Gaussian conﬁdence distributions, f(x|C) and f(x|I) (Green & Swets, 1966). In fact, the
Type II probability distributions used in the model are known to deviate from these assumptions (Fig. 1b; Galvin et al., 2003).
Such deviations produce interactions between Type II d0 and shifts in criterion (Evans & Azzopardi, 2007). However, we con-
sider it unlikely that our observation of decreasing d0w with wager size is an artefact of a criterion shift, for two reasons. First,
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slight increases in d0w (Fig. 5a, left-hand panel; see also Evans & Azzopardi, 2007). The opposite is seen in the data for low-
visibility stimuli (Fig. 5b, left-hand panel and Fig. 6). Second, the same effects hold when an overall measure of the wagering
‘‘error” rate is calculated (overall proportion of false alarms and misses in Table 1). Collapsing over stimulus visibility, greater
errors were seen in the usage of a £10 wager (45 ± 5%) than in the usage of a £1 wager (34 ± 3%).4. Discussion
Measuring conscious awareness is fraught with controversy (Seth, Dienes, Cleeremans, Overgaard, & Pessoa, 2008) where
even the simplest of methods, asking for subjective reports, is dogged by the conundrum of response bias (Eriksen, 1960).
Recently, wagering contingent on decision performance (post-decision wagering) has been proposed as a direct and intuitive
measure of conscious awareness (Koch & Preuschoff, 2007; Persaud et al., 2007; Persaud & McLeod, 2008). In the present
study, we examine how economic factors affect wagers placed on perceptual decisions, and consider the theoretical impli-
cations our results have for post-decision wagering as a measure of subjective awareness.
Our signal detection model, derived from equations developed by Galvin et al. (2003), deﬁnes the transformations of
noisy sensory evidence into conﬁdence distributions on which wagering responses are based. Due to inherent loss aversion
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Schurger & Sher, 2008), this model predicts that advantageous wagering (Type II hits) on a per-
ceptual event depends on the size of the gamble, despite sensory evidence remaining constant. Our psychophysics data con-
ﬁrm this pattern of predicted results. Our ﬁndings suggest that loss aversion is a key modulator of the linkage between
perceptual sensitivity and conﬁdent wagering. This effect was true even for the highest stimulus visibility, demonstrating
a labile linkage between perception and behaviour.
It is clear from these results that the typical post-decision wagering measure – advantageous wagering, or Type II hit rate
– is subject to a bias induced by loss aversion, despite underlying Type I sensitivity as measured by responses to the stimulus
remaining constant. Data from a related task requiring uncertainty monitoring (a scholastic aptitude test where omission of
responses was allowed), revealed an analogous reduction in test score when the penalty for incorrect answers was increased
(Higham, 2007). Higham went on to show that this reduction was due to more conservative Type II response criteria in the
high-penalty condition. Similarly, our model predicts that the effect of loss aversion on advantageous wagering is largely due
to a criterion (cw) shift, reducing the propensity of the subject to opt for the high wager regardless of whether her ﬁrst re-
sponse was correct or not. In contrast, Type II wagering efﬁciency (d0w; the difference between good and bad wagers in
Table 1) should remain relatively constant in the face of changing wager size. In our psychophysical task, we ﬁnd predictable
effects of the wager size on Type II response criteria, but also observe decreases in d0w as a function of wager size for near-
threshold stimuli. In other words, for the same underlying task performance, participants become worse at discriminating
between their own correct and incorrect responses as wager size increases.
Previous work has shown that Type II sensitivity and criterion are not in fact independent when derived from contingency
tables such as Table 1 (Evans & Azzopardi, 2007), assuming equal variance Type I distributions (Galvin et al., 2003). Indeed,
similar (but more subtle) increases in sensitivity as a function of wager size were predicted by our model (Fig. 5a, left panel).
However, the empirical effect we observe is a decrease in d0w for near-threshold stimuli as wager size increases (Fig. 5b, left
panel and Fig. 6). What might cause this decrease in wagering efﬁciency on high-wager blocks? It is possible that the prospect
of high wagers interferes with participants’ performance monitoring on low-visibility (difﬁcult) trials. However, this account
might also predict decreases in Type I task performance, which are not seen in our data.We note that recent evidence suggests
that the prospect of large rewards (comparable to those used in the present study) causes paradoxical performance decre-
ments (Mobbs et al., 2009; see also Baumeister, 1984). Whether such inﬂuences of large rewards on behaviour could also lead
to a reduction in performance monitoring, consistent with the present data, is a question that requires further study.
4.1. Generation of conﬁdence
Two inherent assumptions of our model deserve attention in order to illustrate the current limitations of a purely signal
detection-based theory of conﬁdence. A ﬁrst assumption is that the initial sensory judgement is unbiased. Empirically, how-
ever, there was a consistent bias towards responding ‘‘word” for the medium and high stimulus visibility conditions. As this
bias was consistent across wager size, it is unlikely to affect our conclusions regarding the effects of wager size on behaviour.
However, it does affect how we characterise the link between underlying stimulus distributions and conﬁdence, an issue we
consider below. A second assumption of the model is that the criteria for wagering are symmetrical (Fig. 1b). This corre-
sponds to equating the conﬁdence required to wager high for words and non-words. In our behavioural data, we see a more
conservative criterion for wagering high following non-word decisions. However, this shift was expressed consistently
across conditions, leaving unaffected the main conclusions we infer regarding changes in cw and d
0
w as a function of wager
size. In our model, wagering criteria are symmetric because the same utility function is applied to symmetric signal and
noise distributions. Within this framework, a baseline difference in wagering criteria may be caused by the variance of
the signal (word) distribution being greater than the noise (non-word) distribution, leading to a more prominent f(I|x) dis-
tribution following non-word responses and requiring more conservative criteria to maintain a given level of wagering per-
formance. Interestingly, greater signal variance when compared to noise in empirical ROCs has been documented in the
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response factors are the main drivers of the observed asymmetry in wagering criteria.
These behavioural deviations from the model hint at a deeper issue regarding the relationship between Type I task per-
formance and metacognitive conﬁdence (Baranski & Petrusic, 2001; Busey, Tunnicliff, Loftus, & Loftus, 2000; Higham et al.,
2009). In our signal detection model, probability distributions over the stimulus are assumed to deterministically give rise to
Type II conﬁdence distributions, without invoking the notion of intermediate processing stages. Higham et al. (2009) identify
this generation of conﬁdence from stimulus distributions as the ‘‘direct translation hypothesis”. They empirically tested this
hypothesis by varying Type I response criteria in a memory paradigm, noting that Type II sensitivity should be systematically
affected if Type I distributions are indeed directly translated into Type II distributions, a conclusion supported by their data
(Higham et al., 2009; Experiment 3). However, recent human psychophysical data reveal dissociations between objective
performance and subjective conﬁdence, suggesting a more complex relationship between Type I and Type II distributions
(Wilimzig, Tsuchiya, Fahle, Einhauser, & Koch, 2008; see also Busey & Arici, 2009). In addition, reaction time measures sug-
gest that conﬁdence is at least partly determined by additional processing following the decision itself (Baranski & Petrusic,
1998, 2001). In the present study, word–non-word discrimination may be a suboptimal testbed for the direct translation
hypothesis, given that the evidence dimension is unlikely to be unitary. For example, some words may be easier to process
than others, engendering higher ﬂuency and thus inﬂuencing metacognitive assessment (Kelley & Lindsay, 1993; Koriat,
1993; Winkielman, Halberstadt, Fazendeiro, & Catty, 2006). Future work is needed examine the empirical form of Type I
and Type II distributions under simpler psychophysical conditions.
4.2. Post-decision wagering and awareness
What do the present results say about post-decision wagering as a measure of awareness? On a psychological level, the
use of advantageous wagering counts (Type II hit rate) is confounded by factors (presumably) external to stimulus awareness
(see also Dienes & Seth, 2009). For example, blindsight subject GY was seen to wager high 48% of the time after correct re-
sponses to stimuli in his blind hemiﬁeld (Persaud et al., 2007; p. 257). Persaud and colleagues argue that as this proportion is
no better than chance (50%), it is evidence for a lack of awareness. However, it is clear from the model and data we present
here that simply altering the size of the wager can manipulate this proportion to be consistent with higher or lower aware-
ness. Application of Type II SDT measures to GYs response counts might be a more convincing demonstration of a lack of
awareness (Persaud et al. (2007), their Supplementary Table 6; but see Clifford et al. (2008)). Again, however, this measure
is not perfect: we ﬁnd changes in wager size produced unpredictable effects on d0w for the types of near-threshold stimuli
often used in consciousness research, and particular forms of the payoff matrix can produce values of d0w consistent with
a lack of awareness (Clifford et al., 2008). Further problems arise when making comparisons across subjects, or when com-
paring patients with controls: in our model ﬁt, loss aversion varied considerably between subjects (and may vary in an even
more unpredictable fashion within different patient populations), leading to the interpretation of wagering responses being
confounded by individual differences in the subjective utility of the gamble (Dienes & Seth, 2009; Schurger & Sher, 2008).
There are obvious instances where the ease of use and nonverbal nature of wagering may outweigh such drawbacks, for in-
stance when measuring awareness in non-human animals and children. In these cases, care should be taken to address
potentially illusory changes in awareness caused by economic factors.
On a philosophical level, even if it is possible to control for the confounding effects of loss aversion, it is unclear whether
awareness can be inferred from successful wagering (Seth, 2008). Recent data demonstrates that adaptive, value-based re-
sponses can be made in response to stimuli that are below an objective threshold of awareness (Pessiglione et al., 2007,
2008). Indeed, from an economist’s perspective, a post-decision wager is a gamble in which the sensory uncertainty deter-
mines the probabilities of winning and losing. Graded changes in either the stimulus or outcome utilities will produce prob-
abilistic changes in wagering behaviour, which may not have obvious mappings to particular states of consciousness. In
contrast, explicitly taking into account this graded nature of processing using, for example, direct conﬁdence rating scales
may offer more robust means of assessing both objective sensitivity and subjective meta-sensitivity (Szczepanowski & Pes-
soa, 2007). In this regard our results emphasise the importance of considering both stimulus and response variables when
assessing conscious awareness (Clifford et al., 2008; Evans & Azzopardi, 2007; Hulme, Friston, & Zeki, 2009).
In summary, using a combination of signal detection theory and psychophysics we show that the translation of perceptual
sensitivity into a post-decision wagering response is systematically affected by economic variables, in this instance by loss
aversion. Type II signal detection measures reveal that changes in behaviour induced by changes in wager size are largely dri-
ven by changes in criterion, consistentwith ourmodel. However, when stimulus visibility is low andwagers are large, a reduc-
tion in wagering efﬁciency is also seen. Indeed, the complex interaction between objective stimulus visibility, wager size and
the subsequent willingness to gamble casts doubt on an assertion (Persaud et al., 2007) that post-decisionwagering is a direct
index of subjective awareness, despite its intuitive nature. Such interactions raise intriguing questions for futurework into the
relationship between stimulus processing, subjective awareness and the generation of metacognitive conﬁdence.
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